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Hidden Unemployment and Older Male Workers 
 





A number of policy reforms have recently been announced by the Commonwealth 
government to encourage greater labour force participation by older people in the 
context of an ageing society. These policy reforms are generally supply side in 
orientation such as the removal of the Mature Age Allowance, or restrictions to 
the Disability Support Pension. In this paper it is argued that these pensions have 
historically been used to accommodate otherwise unemployed older male 
workers. A number of methods are used to quantify the level of hidden 
unemployment within the older male population over recent decades. Estimates of 
adjusted unemployment rates, which include hidden as well as official 
unemployment, reveal a very dramatic picture of unutilised older male labour 
beneath relatively modest official unemployment rates. It is argued that without 
complementary employment policy addressing the labour demand side these 
policy reforms will achieve little except to reveal the previously high levels of 









A number of recent Commonwealth government policy reforms have sought to increase the 
labour force participation of older people aged 55 to 64 years in the face of an ageing society 
(for example DFaCS 2000a, 2001, 2002a, 2002b, Treasury 2004, and House of 
Representatives 2000). As such, recent attempts have been made to restrict access to various 
social security pensions such as the Disability Support Pension (DSP) and Mature Age 
Allowance (MAA) that have traditionally accommodated older males not in the labour force. 
Other policies put forth are designed to encourage training and non-standard employment of 
older people. These policies can be largely characterised as supply side, affecting the 
individual’s budget constraint and (labour) marketable skills. No employment subsidies, job 
creation or other demand side policies for older people have been foreshadowed.   
 
O’Brien’s (2003) empirical analysis of micro data, based on the orthodox theory of labour 
supply, failed to adequately explain recent trends in the labour force participation rate of older 
males. Furthermore, other analyses conducted by O’Brien (2001a and 2001b) suggest that 
findings from models based upon aggregate labour market explanations, especially those 
incorporating labour force discouragement variables, can account for the majority of the 
stylised facts concerning the labour force participation rate and social security pension receipt 
of older males in recent decades. Findings from this research imply that large pools of hidden 
unemployment may be concealed beneath relatively low official unemployment rates. With 
this in mind, a number of methods are used within this paper to estimate total (official + 
hidden) unemployment for older males for the period 1979 to 1999. The results have 
implications for the likely success of policy reforms aimed at addressing an ageing society.  
 
A brief review of relevant statistics, literature and policy reforms are contained in Sections 2 
to 4. Results obtained from econometric models of the labour force participation rate and 
social security use rate by older males are presented in Sections 5 and 6. Various methods 
used to calculate hidden and total unemployment for older males are explained in Section 7, 
followed by the presentation of estimates in Section 8. Finally, the implications of the 
findings for ageing society policy reforms are explored in Section 9.  
 
 
2. Stylised facts of older male workers  
 
The set of stylised facts presented below were originally published in O’Brien (1999) and are 
broadly consistent with the research findings of VandenHeuval (1999).1 It is evident that a 
number of changes to labour force participation patterns of older males have occurred over 
recent decades. 
 
2.1 The decline in labour force participation rates of older males during the 1970’s and 
1980’s, and their stability at a low level in the 1990’s.  
A marked trend in Australian and international labour markets over recent decades has been 
the decline in labour force participation rates of older males  (for example Merrilees 1982, 
Hughes 1984 and Stille 1999). In Australia at least, this trend is in contrast to generally 
increasing labour force participation rates for older females (O’Brien 2000a). It is shown in 
Figure 1 that while there has been a decline in labour force participation rates over time for all 
male age groups presented, this decline appears to increase with age group. The decrease in 
labour force participation rates from 1966 to 1999 is equal to six, eighteen and thirty one 
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percentage points for males prime-aged, 55-59, and 60-64 years, respectively. The rapid 
decline in labour force participation rates of older males began in the early 1970s and 
extended into the 1980’s. A minor rebound is evident in the late 1980’s. However, older male 
labour force participation rates have remained at their relatively low 1980s rates throughout 
the 1990’s.  
 
Figure 1 Australian male labour force participation rates (%) – 1966 to 1999 
 
Source: ABS (1986, 1999a) 
 
 
2.2 Stylised Fact 2) Marginal growth in the older male unemployment rate relative to that of 
prime-age males in 1980’s and 1990’s, and sustained higher average duration of 
unemployment for older males compared to other age groups over recent decades.  
The unemployment problems of older workers have historically been overshadowed by the 
high unemployment rates of youth (see for example, Biddle and Burgess 1999). Indeed, the 
main feature of Figure 2 is that the unemployment rates for older and prime aged males are a 
lot closer than their respective labour force participation rates. Although not as dramatic as the 
changes in labour force participation rates, in recent times the unemployment rates of older 
male workers appear to be increasing marginally relative to that of prime-aged males. 
Unemployment rates for prime-aged and older male age groups in Australia were similar up 
until 1983 but after this time a gap emerges, with the unemployment rate for those aged 60-64 
years rising relative to prime-aged males. This gap becomes more dramatic after 1991. 
However, of equal note, the unemployment rate for males aged 60-64 years suddenly falls 
after 1994, from over 15% to around 5% in less than two years, thereby falling back in line 
with that of the prime-age group. For males aged 55-59 years, a similar unemployment rate 
gap emerges after 1991, remaining until the late 1990’s. It should be noted that the years 1983 
and 1991 coincided with the onset of recessions in Australia. Therefore, on the surface a more 
pronounced ratchet effect is apparent for older male unemployment rates. That is, the 
observation that unemployment rates rise rapidly at the onset of a recession but do not return 
to their previous level in the subsequent recovery, with the average unemployment rate 
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60-64 years in 1994, so close to the onset of this most recent (1991) recession, is not 
consistent with the ratchet effect. 
 
Figure 2 Australian male unemployment rates (%) – 1975 to 1999 
Source: ABS (1986, 1999a) 2 
 
 
2.3 Stylised Fact 3) High and (mostly) growing proportion of older males relying on social 
security pensions.  
Within Australia’s social security system, pensions can be distinguished from allowances, 
with the former generally designed for longer term reliance and not entailing any job search 
requirements. If recipients of social security pensions and allowances are not actively 
searching for employment or undertaking employment, which is likely, they will be counted 
as not in the labour force (NILF), in the ABS’ Labour Force Survey (LFS).3 It is shown in 
Figure 3 that the proportion of older males receiving social security pensions4 generally 
mirrors the pattern in labour force participation rates evident in Figure 1. That is, increases in 
the proportion of social security pension recipients over time are approximately reflected in 
lower labour force participation rates. While this pattern is clearly evident in social security 
pension and NILF statistics for males aged 55-59 years, it is also shown in Figure 3 that this 
relationship is not consistent over time for males aged 60-64 years. A small increase in the 
proportion of this population relying on non-wage sources of income other than social 
security pensions throughout the late 1980’s until the early 1990’s is apparent, despite the 
proportion of the population NILF remaining stable since the early 1980’s. It is also shown in 
Figure 3 that for males aged 60-64 years this gap between the proportion receiving social 
security pensions and those NILF appears to have narrowed in more recent times. Similar to 
previous stylised facts for this age group, this change emerges around 1994. It would be 
erroneous to equate NILF with retirement. The majority of those males NILF in the 55-64 
year-old age group cite bad health, rather than retirement, as their main reason for labour 
force absence. Other recent statistics highlight the prevalence for job loss5 prior to labour 
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Figure 3 Australian males receiving social security pensions and NILF (%)  
1972 to 1999 
 
Source: BLMR (1983), OECD (1995a), ABS (1986, 1999a), unpublished DVA and DFaCS statistics   
 
O’Brien (2001a) also showed there had been a changing composition of social security 
pension receipt within the 60-64 year-old age group male population over time. Table 1 shows 
that the receipt of the Age Service Pension (ASP) accounted for the majority of older males 
receiving social security pensions up until the mid 1980’s, however the Disability Support 
Pension (DSP) and the Mature Age Allowance (MAA) recipients now account for the 
majority of older males receiving social security pensions. Whereas receipt of the ASP was 
based upon prior war service, DSP and MAA eligibility reflect labour market conditions and 
older worker long-term unemployment (O’Brien 2001a). Notably, the MAA was introduced 
in 1994, thereby coinciding with a number of changes to official statistics for males aged 60-
64 years, as previously discussed.  
 
Table 1 Older males receiving social security allowances and pensions (% of age group)  
1972 to 1997 
 55-59 years 60-64 years 
Year NSA DSP NSA ASP DSP MAA 
1972 1 4 1 4 8 n.a. 
1977 2 7 2 12 13 n.a. 
1982 3 8 2 22 13 n.a. 
1987 * 12 * 13 16 n.a. 
1992 7 13 8 2 23 n.a. 
1997 8 16 2 1 25 15 
Source:  BLMR (1983), OECD (1995b), unpublished DVA and DFaCS statistics 
NSA = NewStart Allowance  
DSP = Disability Support Pension  
ASP = Age Service Pension  
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3. Relevant literature 
 
It was previously noted in Stylised Fact 1 that from the mid 1970’s to the mid 1980’s the 
labour force participation rates of older males declined substantially, a phenomenon that was 
not experienced previously in Australia. This decline was the focus of initial research in the 
early to mid 1980’s into older worker labour force issues. The BLMR (1983), Hughes (1984), 
and Merrilees (1986) provide summaries of the main debates addressed in this literature. 
Stricker and Sheehan (1981), Merrilees (1983), Miller (1983) and the BLMR (1983) provided 
quantitative estimates of various influences upon labour force participation rates of older 
males.  
 
Merrilees (1986) summarised the literature of competing theories of the economic 
determinants of older male labour force participation from this era. He claimed (1986: 220): 
 
In summary, a consensus is at last emerging which emphasises the life cycle private 
wealth effects as the key to the long term trend to early retirement, though not 
necessarily the short run (1973-76) acceleration in such.  
 
The explanatory framework was clearly established and debate focused on the relative 
contribution of three factors in explaining declining labour force participation rates of older 
males. The factors were 
a) increased private wealth and the choice of earlier (anticipated) substitution of work for 
leisure; 
b) increased availability and financial attractiveness of social security pensions; and  
c) the discouraged worker hypothesis and hidden unemployment.  
 
The first theme reflected the application of a lifecycle model of labour force participation 
under conditions of certainty, whereby more recent cohorts of older people with greater 
private wealth, were able to afford to retire earlier. Hughes (1984: 7) commented that 
retirement trends were the result of past accumulation of successive waves of real wage 
increases sending “stored-up ripples in older worker participation rates many years later.” 
Rather than an immediate income effect from an increase in wages, an intertemporal 
relationship was asserted whereby wage increases over time were effectively saved and used 
to purchase leisure at an earlier retirement age. Miller (1983) emphasised the forward looking 
aspect of the lifecycle model under conditions of certainty, via retirement planning and 
expectations, in explaining trends in the labour force participation rate of males aged 60-64 
years from 1973 to 1983. He claimed that the decline in older male labour force participation 
rates throughout the 1970’s to the early 1980’s reflected lifecycle planning decisions taken 
prior to 1973.  
 
Other researchers emphasised two unanticipated events of the 1970’s as alternative 
explanations of changing trends in the labour force participation rate of older males. The first 
of these was the increase in availability and financial attractiveness of social security 
pensions. Merrilees (1982) calculated that nearly all of the decline in the labour force 
participation rate of males aged 55-59 years in the period 1973 to 1980 was the result of 
greater receipt of the Invalid (DSP) pension.6 Furthermore, of the twenty six percentage point 
decline in labour force participation rates of males aged 60-64 years between 1973 and 1980, 
Merrilees (1982) calculated that increased receipt of the Age Service Pension (ASP) 
accounted for fifteen percentage points and was the dominant explanatory force, with the 




The second unanticipated event related to a discouraged worker effect relating to the 
deterioration of the labour market. While the relationship between labour force participation 
and the business cycle was not a new topic in Australia or overseas (for example, Gregory and 
Sheehan 1973, Carter and Gregory 1981, and Bowen and Finegan 1969), Stricker and 
Sheehan (1981) used this relationship to attribute almost all the decline in labour force 
participation for older males in the 1970s to recession induced hidden unemployment and the 
discouraged worker explanation.7 Acknowledging a role for social security pensions within 
this explanation, Stricker and Sheehan (1981), using econometric modeling,  estimated a large 
role for recessions and unemployment, not increased pension financial attractiveness, for the 
increase in DSP and ASP receipt for older males.  
 
From the mid 1980s older male labour force participation rates were low and relatively  
stable. There was little research into why this was so, or into older worker participation 
specifically. However, there has been a continuing discussion in the Australian literature on 
the extent of discouraged worker effects and hidden unemployment. Much of this subsequent 
research was not reported by age, or discussed specifically for older age groups, but had 
obvious implications for them. 
 
For example, The BLMR (1985) presented a number of alternative estimates of 
unemployment and labour force participation rates incorporating underutilisation and hidden 
unemployment concepts. Two econometric methods were used by the BLMR (1985) to 
calculate hidden unemployment. The first method utilised the coefficient attached to 
unemployment from an econometric model of male labour force participation rates. The 
alternative method added a time trend variable to the model specification, attributing this 
effect to hidden unemployment. This latter method was purported to identify long-run 
structural discouragement, versus the short-run discouragement effects captured by the 
unemployment rate variable and coefficient. This structural discouragement was deemed to be 
a reflection of persistent high unemployment and the rationing of employment to the most 
efficient workers, presumably those of prime-age.  
 
Wooden (1993 and 1996) presented estimates of both hidden unemployment and 
underemployment8 as measures of labour underutilisation. While most estimates were 
presented at the aggregate level, there were some age-specific estimates. Wooden (1993) 
found that the likelihood of (visible) underemployment declined with age. The likelihood of 
being discouraged as a proportion of the age group NILF fell with age. However, the 
likelihood of being a discouraged worker increased with age if measured as a proportion of 
that age group’s labour force.  Wooden (1996) analysed the changing composition of labour 
underutilisation over time. His findings included an increase in the proportion of 
underemployed and hidden unemployed that were aged 45+ years.  
 
Mitchell (1999, 2001) and Mitchell and Carlson (2000) provided further estimates of 
underemployment and hidden unemployment. Mitchell (1999, 2001) chose an econometric 
modelling method rather than trend extrapolation, to estimate hidden unemployment of 
disaggregated sex and age groups in Australia and the U.S.. The labour force participation rate 
equation of each age-sex group was specified as a function of both a linear time trend and the 
employment to population ratio for the 15-64 year-old age group. Mitchell (1999: 4) stated 
“The models seek adequate representations of the movements in terms of secular filters and 




The coefficient attached to the aggregate employment to population ratio variable measured 
the cyclical sensitivity of the labour force participation rates. The volume of hidden 
unemployment was calculated by multiplying this coefficient by the difference between a full 
employment to population benchmark and the actual employment to population ratio. 
Findings confirmed that the labour force participation rate of older males is more cyclically 
sensitive than that of prime-age males. However, one must bear in mind the simple 
specification of the econometric model, noting the above quote of seeking an adequate 
specification for all age groups, and question whether more accurate estimates of hidden 
unemployment could be generated by concentrating on various influences specific to older 
age groups.  
 
Agyrous and Neale (2000, 2001) broadened the analysis of hidden unemployment by using 
DSP claimant counts to estimate hidden unemployment. This analysis was conducted under 
the assumption that DSP recipients could be divided into two subgroups that reflected the 
medically disabled and the labour market disabled. Argyrous and Neale (2000) used the 
proportion of DSP recipients in 1982 to estimate the medically disabled in the years following 
a policy crackdown on non-medical disability eligibility. In Argyrous and Neale (2001) the 
proportion of DSP recipients in 1972, a period of full employment, was used to estimate the 
medically disabled. In both cases growth after 1982 or 1972 in DSP recipients represented the 
labour market disabled, reflecting worsening labour market conditions. Adding the labour 
market disabled people to recorded unemployment, following labour accounting principles, 
revealed a greater ratchet effect in the unemployment rates. Especially over the 1990’s, there 
was an increasing gap between recorded and imputed unemployment rates, implying a greater 
level of entrenched discouragement and unemployment persistence not reflected in official 
statistics. Results were not reported by age but obviously have indirect implications for older 
workers, who are relatively reliant on the DSP.  
 
 
4. Policy interest in older workers 
 
The average age of Australians is increasing as a result of declining birthrates and increased 
life expectancy (Borowski and Hugo 1997). With a greater number of people experiencing a 
longer period of leisure or economic inactivity in later life, there are expected to be different 
patterns of consumption and public spending. The major fiscal implications of this future 
situation relate to the public provision of health care and social security pensions. The retired 
population has been historically dependent upon the State purse for these services (EPAC 
1988). Therefore, budget commitments to these areas are expected to intensify after the year 
2010 with the impending retirement of the baby boomer generation. 9 In response, the 
“National Strategy for an Ageing Australia” policy platform has recently been formulated by 
the Commonwealth government, which will have important implications for older workers 
(Bishop 1999). 
 
As well as encouraging individuals to finance their own retirement income and pay for their 
own health care, an alternative policy to allay future budget pressures identified in the 1980’s 
was to encourage longer labour force participation of older workers (EPAC 1988). Research 
has shown that projections of government social security expenditure in the future are reduced 
if early retirement trends are reversed and/or a later age of retirement is established (for 
example, Guest and McDonald 1999, 2000, Access Economics Pty Ltd 2001). Thus, 
legislation was introduced at the federal level and in all states throughout the 1990’s to 
prevent age discrimination in employment and retirement practices. More recently, a number 
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of policy reforms have been initiated as part of the “National Strategy for an Ageing 
Australia” to encourage greater labour force participation by older workers. Examples include 
those contained in welfare reform proposals (DFaCS 2000a), the House of Representatives 
inquiry into older age unemployment (House of Representatives 2000), the 2001-02 and 
2002-03 Commonwealth Budgets (DFaCS 2001, 2002a), and the “Australians Working 
Together” policy (DFaCS 2002b). Proposed policy is supply side based, with the potential 
role of labour demand constraints to labour force participation generally considered to be 
minor. For example, policy initiatives include restrictions to social security pensions 
traditionally used by the older population prior to the age of 65 years and increased access to 
training for the older unemployed, rather than job creation or subsidies. It has been stated that 
these policies will increase the labour force participation of welfare recipients and lower 
unemployment (DFaCS 2000a).  
 
 
5. Econometric models of older males’ labour force participation rates and social 
security use 
 
This section presents results from an econometric model that incorporates the three major 
influences on labour-force participation rates (LFPR) of older males: private wealth 
accumulation, social security value and eligibility, and labour force discouragement. That is: 
 




The model specification used in the present exercise shares some core similarities with those 
undertaken in Australia in the 1980s (for example, the BLMR 1983, Merrilees 1983). 
However, key differences exist with both variable specification and diagnostic testing 
procedures used (O’Brien 2001a). Common to both is the use of older male age groups’ 
labour force participation rates as dependent variables (LFPR), social security pension 
replacement rates (RRPS) to represent pension value, the free area of income in social 
security (FREES) to incorporate earnings rules within pensions, the proportion of ex-
servicemen reflecting ASP eligibility in the LFPR60-64 equation (SERV), and the use of the 
prime-age male unemployment rate (URPR) representing the business cycle and labour 
market conditions to capture labour force discouragement.10 
 
A key difference with previous econometric model specifications is the inclusion of the 
twenty-year average of annual changes in real AWE  (20YRGR) rather than a linear time 
trend variable, to address private wealth accumulation and life-cycle model theory. This 
specification is chosen to represent the accumulation of labour market earning increases over 
the long-term. It may also reflect accrued private pension entitlements related to earnings. 
While the use of twenty years is arbitrary, it should address the ripple effects outlined in 
Hughes (1984) over a reasonable period. From both an economic and econometric theory 
viewpoint, this should be a better specification than the time trend variable used in previous 
modelling. 
 
A more subtle difference to previous models is the use of the prime-age unemployment 
variable, lagged one year (ie. URPR-1), rather than entering the equation in its 
contemporaneous form (URPR).11 This cyclical discouragement relationship is specified as 
non-contemporaneous, because it is contended that labour force discouragement is not 
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instantaneous, and older males who drop out of the labour force are likely to do so after 
initially passing through the unemployment queues first. For those in receipt of MAA, the 
non-contemporaneous relationship is explicitly incorporated into eligibility rules that specify 
that the individual must be unemployed for at least nine months. It is also alleged that older 
DSP recipients in Australia are likely to pass through the unemployment link first (for 
example, Cai 2001, Chalmers 2002). As such, NILF status, and the resulting effect on labour 
force participation rates, should occur after a period of unemployment. Even without access to 
social security pensions, cyclical discouragement is likely to be a delayed response to the 
labour market conditions captured by the prime-age unemployment rate. 
 
Another new feature adopted in the model is the incorporation of the influence of an 
alternative labour force discouragement variable, as suggested in Blöndal and Scarpetta 
(1998). This is included in the model as the proportion of prime-aged males within the 
working age male population (PRIMEPR). This influence is similar to the long-run labour 
force discouragement concept proposed by Standing (1978) and the BLMR (1983). The 
hypothesis that any increase in this proportion will crowd out older workers from 
participating in the labour market over time rests on two key assumptions. First, that prime-
age workers are more attractive to employers than older workers. Second, employers are 
rationing available jobs to those most attractive under the labour market conditions of 
persistent excess labour supply. This represents a kind of labour demand constraint upon 
labour supply, or a form of discouraged worker effect and hidden unemployment, not directly 
related to the business cycle. In summary, the aforementioned URPR variable captures 
cyclical or short-run labour force discouragement, while the PRIMEPR variable captures the 
more entrenched long-run labour force discouragement. The estimated effects from these 
variables upon labour force participation rates are later used to calculate older male hidden 
unemployment.  
 
A number of social security pension eligibility dummy variables were also included to test 
various phases of DSP reforms. If successful, these reforms should reduce DSP claimants and 
increase the labour force participation rate. Furthermore, a dummy variable for the effect of 
the introduction of MAA in 1994 is included in the LFPR60-64 equation.12 If MAA 
introduction had a significant effect upon older male labour force participation rates it should 
have removed older males from the labour force previously receiving unemployment 
allowances and displaying unemployed labour force status. 
 
Another difference with previous models estimated in Australia is the longer time period 
under analysis. The longer time period should allow for more exact  disentanglement of 
competing explanations and also allow for the identification of any structural breaks in the 
relationships, if any.  
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Table 2 Labour force participation rate (LFPR) model explanatory variable 
specification 
Explanatory Variable Specification and values taken a priori effect on LFPR 
 


























Pension real free area (FREES) 
 
FREEt/CPIt Ambiguous 
Eligible ex-servicemen (SERV) 
 
SERVICEMEN60-64,t/POPmale,60-64,t Negative 
MAA operation (MAA) 
 
=1 1994 to 1999, 0 otherwise Negative 
DSP medical restriction (DSP1) 
 
=1 1979 to 1982, 0 otherwise Positive 
DSP 50% rule (DSP2) 
 
=1 1987 to 1990, 0 otherwise Positive 
DSP impairment tables  (DSP3) 
 




Unemployment ratemale,25-44,t-1  Negative 




Source: ABS (1999a, 1999b, 1999c), DFaCS (2000b), unpublished DVA statistics 
AWE = average weekly earnings 
CPI = consumer price index 
Pen = maximum pension rate  
FREE = pension free area 
SERVICEMEN = number of war veterans 
POP = population  
 
A number of diagnostic tests were conducted using the econometric software package PcGive 
to assess the adequacy of the estimated models (Hendry and Doornik 1996). Apart from the 
Durbin Watson test, a Lagrange Multiplier for up to second order serial correlation of the 
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with 2IID(0, )e σ∼ . The null hypothesis is that there is no serial correlation (Breusch 1978). 
 
The autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity (ARCH) test checks whether the variance of 
the error term at time t depends upon the squared error terms from previous periods (Engle 
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with 2IID(0, )e τ∼ . The null hypothesis is no ARCH(1). 
 
The normality test checks whether the residuals are normally distributed as: 
 
 2(0, )tu IN σ∼  with 3( ) 0tE u =  and 4 4( ) 3tE u σ=  2,2αχ∼  
 
The null hypothesis is that there is normality (Kiefer and Salmon 1983).  
 
A regression specification test (RESET) is conducted to test the functional form (Ramsey 
1969). Misspecification of functional form would be apparent if ty  depends on non-linear 
functions nty . In the simplest form,  
 
 ' 22t t t ty x y uβ α= + +  
 
RESET involves an F-test of the statistical significance of 2α ( ,1, 1n kFα − −∼ ). Finally, parameter 
instability estimates are reported for each coefficient using within-sample parameter 
constancy testing according to Hansen (1994).  
 
The rejection of any of these hypotheses tests is depicted with an asterisk in the output 
presented. A satisfactory model should be congruent with available evidence with realistic 
parameter estimates. Furthermore, a satisfactory model should be able to satisfy the 
requirements of the battery of diagnostic tests presented above.   
 
Estimation results for labour force participation rates of males aged 55-59 years (LFPR55-59) 
and 60-64 years (LFPR60-64) for the period 1966 to 1999 are presented in Table 3. Note that 
variables reflecting MAA and ASP were excluded from the LFPR55-59 model as males in 
this age group are not eligible for such pensions. In general, the models satisfy the diagnostic 
tests and results appear to be robust. Although a number of coefficients are statistically 
significant, the major quantitative influence in explaining older male labour force 
participation rates over time comes from the variables which are designed to capture short-run 
(URPR-1) and long-run (PRIMEPR) labour force discouragement. These coefficients provided 
statistically significant negative influences in both age groups’ models and accounted for the 
majority of the decline in older male labour force participation rates. Furthermore, the 
magnitude of these effects appears to increase with age group. An increase in the prime-age 
male unemployment rate of one percentage point is suggested to decrease LFPR55-59 by 
almost one percentage point, and LFPR60-64 by nearly one and a half percentage points. 
Furthermore, an increase in the proportion of prime-aged males within the labour force 
population of one percentage point decreases LFPR55-59 by around one and a half percentage 
points, and LFPR60-64 by four percentage points. A dominant role for both cyclical and long-
run labour force discouragement in explaining older male labour force participation rates from 
1966 to 1999 is evident. This finding is clearly in contrast to previous researchers’ findings 
emphasising labour supply variables, and even that of Stricker and Sheehan (1981) who only 
attributed a short-run role for discouraged workers in explaining the deviation of labour force 


































SERV n.a n.a -30.24 
(-2.71**) 
0.06 

































R2 0.972  0.979  
DW 2.01  1.92  
AR(1-2) 0.363  0.346  
ARCH 0.625  0.405  
Normality 5.474*  5.130*  
RESET 4.642**  0.005  
 
*             statistically significant at the 10% level 
**  statistically significant at the 5% level 
***  statistically significant at the 1% level 
  
6. Econometric models of older males social security reliance 
 
Models of older male ASP and DSP receipt for the period 1972 to 1999 are summarised in 
this section to explain a number of the previous findings (O’Brien 2001b). The same 
explanatory variables were used as appear in the labour-force participation rate model.  Three 
models are estimated using annual data from 1972 to 1999 to explain the proportion of males 
aged 60-64 years on ASP (ASP60-64), and DSP (DSP60-64), and the proportion of males 
aged 55-59 years on DSP (DSP55-59). These estimation results are summarised in Table 4.  
 
A common feature of all model results was the statistically significant positive influence of 
the prime-age unemployment variable (URPR-1), suggesting that the purported relationship 
between recessions, hidden unemployment, and social security pension receipt exists. The 
large effect of labour force discouragement variables, and small effect of policy restrictions, 
upon ASP and DSP receipt over recent decades has two obvious implications. First, hidden 
unemployment within social security pension populations has existed longer than the recent 
upsurge in DSP and MAA in the 1990’s, with ASP previously shielding this effect. This 
suggests that any social security policy reforms must address a history of over twenty years of 
discouraged worker use. Second, restricting eligibility access to social security pensions, or 
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altering earnings rules, are likely to have only a limited effect, if any, on the number of 
pension recipients. The coefficients of DSP1, DSP2 and DSP3 in Table 4 suggest that such 
policy changes have historically been ineffective or have had the opposite effect to that 
desired.  
 































































































R2 0.986  0.952  0.983  
DW 2.20  0.418  2.09  
AR(1-2) 0.456  21.448***  0.767  
ARCH 0.023  13.000***  0.126  
Normality 9.554***  2.056  0.331  
RESET 1.000  12.197***  3.811*  
 
*             statistically significant at the 10% level 
**  statistically significant at the 5% level 
***  statistically significant at the 1% level 
 
 
7. Hidden unemployment estimation methods 
 
The findings from the modelling work suggest that labour force discouragement variables 
largely explain both older male labour force participation rates and social security pension 
trends, with little role for the labour supply choice explanations that emphasise financial 
incentives in the social security system, or wealth accumulation from past wage increases. 
This implies that large pools of hidden unemployment may be concealed beneath relatively 
modest official unemployment rates.13 Two methods are used to estimate hidden 
unemployment using the above findings. The hidden unemployed estimates were added to 
both numerator and denominator of recorded official unemployment rates to calculate total 




The first method uses social security pension statistics and assumes that the pension 
populations can be apportioned between the hidden unemployed, and other recipients. The 
DSP population can hypothetically be divided into the medically disabled and the labour  
market disabled, the latter representing hidden unemployment (Argyrous and Neale 2000, 
2001). Consistent with Argyrous and Neale (2001), the medically disabled males are 
estimated as the proportion of the population in receipt of DSP in 1972 (4.78% of males aged 
55-59 years and 9.49% of males aged 60-64 years) multiplied by the number of males in each 
age category in year t. The number of medically disabled males is subtracted from the number 
of males on DSP to estimate the number of labour market disabled males in years subsequent 
to 1972. Unlike Argyrous and Neale (2000, 2001), this methodology is applied specifically to 
older male age group recipients in this study. Twenty percent of ASP recipients are assumed 
to represent the hidden unemployed for the 60-64 year age group as proposed by Stricker and 
Sheehan (1981).14 Furthermore, assuming that those males aged 60-64 years receiving MAA 
would have been long-term unemployed, as eligibility suggests, they are also included in the 
hidden unemployment estimates. The total adjusted unemployment rates are derived from 
official LFS statistics combined with the aforementioned hidden unemployment estimates 
from ASP, DSP and MAA for males aged 60-64 years, but only using DSP labour market 
disabled for males aged 55-59 years. These estimates are denoted as PENSTAT.  
 
The second method uses the labour force discouragement estimates from the econometric 
modelling of labour force participation rates, ASP, and DSP receipt to calculate alternative 
estimates of hidden unemployment. CYCMOD uses the URPR coefficient from the LFPR 
models, while PENMOD uses the URPR coefficient from the pension usage models. 
AALMOD uses both the URPR and PRIMEPR coefficients from the LFPR models. 15 For 
example, to calculate the PENMOD hidden unemployment rate estimate for males aged 60-64 
years for 1979, the actual prime age unemployment rate for 1978 is multiplied by the URPR-1 
coefficient in the ASP model. This gives the influence of cyclical hidden unemployment on 
the ASP proportion. This number is then multiplied by the civilian population 60-64 age 
group for 1979 to convert this ASP proportion into the actual number of hidden unemployed. 
This procedure is repeated using the DSP model. This estimate of hidden unemployed is 
added to the numerator and denominator of the official unemployment rate to calculate the 
PENMOD total adjusted unemployment rate for 1979 displayed in Figure 9.7. This procedure 
is then repeated for all other years. These PENMOD estimates are reported with and without 
MAA recipients (PENMOD and PENMOD+MAA). 
 
The estimates described above are compared with the official age group unemployment rates 
from the LFS, those estimated using an econometric model by Mitchell (2001), and 
unemployment rates adjusted by ABS discouraged worker estimates.16 Differences in 
estimation results are expected because of the different methods employed. CYCMOD, 
PENMOD and Mitchell (2001) estimates capture only cyclical influences, while entrenched 
discouragement is reflected in PENSTAT estimates and the long-run labour force 
discouragement (PRIMEPR) component of ALLMOD estimates. These differences are 
revealed in Figures 4 and 5. 
 
 
8. Hidden and total unemployment estimates 
 
The main feature of the figures is the divergence of various total adjusted unemployment 
estimates from official unemployment rates and those using ABS discouraged worker 
estimates. PENMOD and CYCMOD estimates are remarkably similar, indicating that hidden 
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unemployed social security pensioners largely constitute the hidden unemployed population. 
The CYCMOD estimates are slightly greater than Mitchell (2001) estimates for males aged 
55-59 years, with greater differences for males aged 60-64 years. A divergence should be 
expected, with Mitchell (2001) basing his estimates on a full employment unemployment rate 
of 4%, whereas PENMOD and CYCMOD are freely estimated.17  
 
As expected, ALLMOD estimates, which include the effects from both the short-run and 
long-run labour force discouragement variables in the labour force participation rate 
econometric model, provide the greatest adjusted unemployment rates, exceeding 25% for 
males aged 55-59 years and 45% for those aged 60-64 years in recent times. Therefore, these 
estimates can generally be regarded as the higher bounds to the adjusted unemployment rates.  
 
An interesting contrast emerges with the estimates using MAA statistics (PENSTAT and 
PENMOD+MAA) for males aged 60-64 years. These total adjusted unemployment rates do 
not fall after 1994 in line with official unemployment rates. With MAA introduced in 1994, it 
adds further weight to the assertion that official unemployment rates for males aged 60-64 
years fell artificially, with total adjusted unemployment rate estimates including MAA long-
term unemployed continuing to rise almost five percentage points until 1997. This confirms 
that the government had the power through social security policy to manipulate the labour 
force outcome of a significant group of older workers in a period of labour supply surplus. 
PENSTAT and PENMOD+MAA estimates imply an entrenchment of unemployment related 
problems not reflected in official, CYCMOD, PENMOD or Mitchell (2001) estimates.  
 
The estimates of unemployment including various estimates of hidden unemployed certainly 
suggest that potentially large unemployment rates would be revealed if not for the existence 
of social security pensions. More fundamentally, official unemployment rates are a 




Figure 4 Total adjusted unemployment rates (official + hidden) - Males aged 55-59 years 
- 1978 to 1999 
 
 
Figure 5 Total adjusted unemployment rates (official + hidden) - Males aged 60-64 years 






Findings presented in this paper confirmed and quantified the relationship between aggregate 
labour market conditions and both older male labour force participation and social security 





























































explanations, and especially labour force discouragement variables, accounted for the 
majority of older males’ labour force participation rate and social security pension receipt 
stylised facts.  
 
The Australian literature presented in Section 3 suggested that a consensus existed amongst 
Australian researchers that early exit from the labour force represented a planned response to 
increased wealth accumulation, however, there was room for short-run effects from the 
unanticipated influences of recessions, and changes to social security value and availability. 
As such, findings from Australian research would have largely fitted in neatly with orthodox 
literature emphasising responses to financial variables, and a voluntary nature to early 
retirement. However, findings presented challenge this consensus and suggest that various 
forms of labour force discouragement explain the bulk of trends.  
 
Findings suggested that ASP had previously played a large hidden unemployment role now 
occupied by DSP and MAA. This means that the current DSP/MAA trends represent the 
continuation and growth of discouraged worker effects from the 1970’s rather than 
representing the emergence of a relatively new phenomenon. Estimates from a number of 
sources suggested that a large proportion of social security pensioners and NILF represent 
hidden unemployed. This implies that older male official unemployment rates have been 
manipulated to be artificially low in a period of labour supply surplus and are misleading as 
an indicator of the older male labour market.  
 
In conclusion, the bulk of evidence suggests that Australia’s government has historically 
treated older workers as a reserve army of labour. Older unemployed males have been 
systematically removed from the labour force in periods of sustained high unemployment. 
Evidence of the large extent or magnitude of the reserve army is contained in the previous 
estimates of hidden unemployment. However, one caveat to this story is the ASP. This 
pension effectively operated as a hidden unemployment policy tool, but cannot be said to have 
been conceived specifically as a reserve army of labour tool to remove older workers from the 
labour force as was MAA, or to have operated as de facto unemployment relief, as with the 
labour market related eligibility contained within DSP.  
 
The finding that variables representing labour force discouragement explain the bulk of older 
male worker labour force participation rate trends, and the accommodating role of social 
security over a long time period, takes on greater significance in the light of recent policy 
changes aimed at addressing ageing population issues.  Attempts to reverse early retirement 
trends via pension reform would tend to be successful if pension availability and value was 
the primary incentive to leave the labour force. However, if government policy was more 
accurately described as accommodating otherwise unemployed older workers, it is unclear 
that supply side policy will increase the employment component of the labour force 
participation rate, and alternatively may have distributional consequences according to those 
who work and those unemployed. Therefore, an important consideration of the proposed 
policy should have been the strength of the social security pension influence in removing 
older workers from the labour market, and the possible symmetry of the reserve army of 
labour relationship. That is, if social security receipt was associated with lower labour force 
participation rates, will removing the so-called disincentives to participation, such as 
restricting access and value of pensions, lead to an increase older worker labour force 
participation, and especially employment? A primary consideration of course, is the likely 
behaviour of the other parties involved. It has been argued that government policy for older 
workers has been influenced by labour market conditions, and has thus accommodated 
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otherwise unemployed older workers in a world of aggregate labour supply surplus. Thus 
labour supply policy without complementary labour demand from employers is likely to do 
little more than reveal large pools of hidden unemployment in official statistics. Older 
workers were targeted as the reserve army of labour during periods of labour supply surplus 
and have subsequently become reliant upon government social security in the absence of full 
employment. Therefore, the move toward greater self-reliance for retirement income appears 
particularly ironic for a group who, by design of policy, have become increasingly reliant 
upon government assistance. With self-provision of retirement income reliant upon labour 
market earnings, the proposed reforms will widen the gap between those with uninterrupted 
high paying full-time employment versus those that may experience employment difficulties. 
Therefore it is likely that this policy will extend an unequal distribution of income into later 
life. 
 
The main caveat to the findings is whether the baby boomer generation will face the same 
poor employment predicament as past older generations. If declining older male labour force 
participation rates had been concentrated amongst the poorly educated and those with few 
credentials it has been argued by government and academic researchers that the baby boomer 
generation, with higher levels of education should display higher older male labour force 
participation rates (for example, McDonald and Kippen 1999). However, this ignores the 
fallacy of composition issue established in O’Brien (2003), that education affected an older 
individual worker’s labour force status, but that changes to human capital composition of the 
older population did not affect their labour force participation rate over time. The only benefit 
for the baby boomer generation may be realised if the relationship between the proportion of 
prime-aged males in the working age population and older male labour force participation 
rates established in econometric modelling holds over time. The continuing decline in the 
proportion of prime-age males in the working age population may mean increased 
opportunities for older workers in the future. Therefore, to an extent, the characteristics of an 
ageing society may carry with it the seeds for decreasing hidden unemployment and 
increasing older male labour force participation rates in the future. The baby boomer 
generation may have crowded out past generations of older workers but may not face the 





                                               
1 Notably, O’Brien (1999) and (2000) contained a more disaggregated and comprehensive analysis of labour 
force statistics covering a longer time period than that of VandenHeuval (1999). 
2 Unlike labour force participation rates which are available from 1966 onward, unemployment rates for males 
55+ are measured only from 1975 onward (ABS 1986). 
3 For example, Flatau et al. (1999) show that only around five percent of males on MAA also receive labour 
market earnings. 
4 This includes the Age Service Pension, Disability Support Pension, and Mature Age Allowance.  
5 A job loser is defined by the ABS to have left their last full-time job involuntarily because they were 
retrenched or laid off, because of ill health or injury, the job was temporary and they did not return to studies, or 
their last job was running their own business which has closed down because of financial difficulties (ABS 1997) 
6 The Invalid Pension was later renamed as the disability support pension (DSP) 
7 Stricker and Sheehan (1981: 54) say “Hidden unemployment is defined as the number of persons, although not 
now in the labour force, would be in the labour force if conditions characteristic of full employment were 
obtained.” 
8 Underemployment can be both visible, with the volume of employment less than desired, as well as invisible 
underemployment, with inefficient use of a worker’s skills (Wooden 1996). 
9 The baby boomer generation is defined as those born after 1946 and before 1960. 
10 A variable representing real average weekly earnings (RAWE) was also included in the specification to 
account for contemporaneous substitution or income effects as in the BLMR (1983). However, this variable was 
adequately captured within the replacement rate specification and was found to be statistically insignificant in 
the various age cohort equations. It is not reported below in model results. 
11 Stricker and Sheehan (1981) also included an unemployment duration variable lagged one period in their 
pension receipt models. 
12 These policy changes over time and their likely influence on older male LFPR are detailed in O’Brien 
(2000b). 
13 Hidden unemployment is defined as the number of persons, not currently in the labour force, who would be in 
the labour force if there was full employment (Stricker and Sheehan 1981: p54). 
14 Results from the ASP econometric model provide an independent estimate of the hidden unemployed in 
PENMOD. 
15 The choice of base year for demographic structure was arbitrary and reflected the use of LFS unemployment 
rates from 1978 to 1999. 
16 The adjusted total unemployment rates using ABS discouraged worker estimates are only available from 1988 
onward. Estimates before this time were either not reported by sex or older age groups, or not reported at all if 
the standard error of the estimate was too high.  
17 No such adjustment has been made for PENMOD and CYCMOD, implicitly assuming a zero percent prime 
unemployment rate for the full employment comparison. Therefore, Mitchell estimates should not diverge by 
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